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Background: In spite of growing number of empirical studies, especially after the start 
of financial crisis, literature fails to provide conclusive answers on the relationship 
between bank competition and stability. Objective: We contribute to the existing 
literature by conducting a bank level analysis of market power implications on CEE 
bank stability and test weather bank market power increases bank stability. 
Approach: On the sample of 415 CEE banks from 1997-2012, we use Distribution free 
approach to generate bank specific market power and efficiency indicators and 
then run a fixed effects panel regression. Results: We find evidence supporting the 
Competition - fragility view; banks with more market power are more stable. Also, we 
find evidence that this stability is a result of lower portfolio risk supporting the 
franchise value channel. Conclusions: For banks in CEE countries where economic 
crisis increased risk materialization, increasing competition from the early 2000s, may 
have been a factor decreasing bank stability which may bear significant 
implications for upcoming years when competition is likely to increase further. 
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The stability of banking sector is an important topic in economic and social context 
since banking crisis can have substantial negative effects on economic output and 
social welfare. Leaven and Valencia (2012) provide an extensive and up-to date 
overview of country-level banking crisis including policy responses and fiscal costs.  
Yet, banking sector stability is determined and linked to many factors usually 
grouped in macroeconomic, financial and structural (Jahn, Kick, 2012). One of the 
factors influencing the bank stability is the level of competition which is defined as a 
level of rivalry between firms. In the period of prolonged financial crisis, the motive 
for investigating this relationship is quite clear which results in rising of the number of 
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work on this matter. Looking from the CEE banks perspective, this issue becomes 
even more important, since they witnessed a noticeable increase in competition 
over the last decade which could even further increase as they become more 
integrated in EU common banking market.  
 Although fairly rich and rapidly growing after the start of the crisis, literature fails to 
reconcile traditional view that competition leads to fragility with somewhat younger 
view that competition promotes bank stability, with both views having theoretical 
and empirical background to some extent. In the meantime, a third group of 
researchers recently emerged claiming that the relationship between bank 
competition and stability is complex one and even case dependent (Allen and 
Gale, 2004). Apart from standard issue of different specifications of various models, 
there are a couple of down-to-earth reasons for inconclusiveness of these results; 
Bank specific yearly market power indicator is relatively hard to produce. Lerner 
index, that would be obvious choice, is calculated from prices and in a way includes 
profitability just like most of the stability indicators. Therefore, we use a relatively new 
measure of bank individual market power, a competition efficiency frontier (CEF). 
Further on, measuring bank stability often proves a difficult task itself as the term itself 
is rather abstract and often observed only ex post. This usually results in authors using 
different indicators of banks stability: non-performing loans ratio, value adjustment 
costs, or some binary indicator based on default threshold. However, it should be 
noted that practitians in recent years started accepting Z-score as an indicator of 
bank market power. But, converging to a standard measure Z-score itself can be 
misleading since it is a product of two separate stabilities (portfolio and leverage) 
and besides, Z-score tends to reward the stability of earnings, even though on a low 
level. 
 To address mentioned issues and explore the specificities of industrial organisation 
in the banking sector, we conduct a bank level analysis and contribute to the bank 
competition - stability research area in a couple of manners. Firstly, our relatively long 
sample (1997-2012) allows us to look at the pre-crisis and crisis period separately and 
contribute to the CEE countries crisis related literature. Also, we calculate a wide set 
of other indicators for CEE banks that help us to see the competition implications 
better. These include: franchise value, regulatory burden, X-efficiency, etc. Special 
attention in the paper is given to the choice of indicators as we believe that recent 
literature may have reached a consensus on them a bit too soon in order to attend 
the techniques.  
 
Relationship between bank competition and stability  
Theoretical and empirical work gives contrasting predictions on the relationship 
between bank competition and stability. Beck (2008) gives a rather extensive 
overview of the literature and points to additional in-depth literature survey by 
Carletti and Hartman (2003) and Allen and Gale (2004). Although results vary in 
every fashion, one could consider earlier work on this matter more inclined to the 
view that competition decreases bank stability, and more recent somewhat more 
inclined to opposing view. Because of this inconsistency, a third approach started to 
emerge based on the idea that relationship between competition and stability is 
complex one and even case dependent (Allen and Gale, 2004). Other ideas state 
that this relationship is not necessarily linear or even intuitive (Caminal and Matutes, 
2002, Allen and Gale, 2004).  
 The traditional view on the relationship between competition and stability 
suggests that increased rivalry between banks makes them more prone to risk taking 
which in turn makes them more fragile. After the Financial crisis of 2007/2008, this, 
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competition - fragility view gained momentum with increased competition being 
viewed by a number of economists as a factor stimulating sub-prime activities in 
United States, or Swiss franc loans in some CEE countries. Anecdotal evidence from 
Croatia suggests that it was competition that stimulated Swiss franc loans expansion 
as the bankers themselves admitted in: Fifth CNB Bank Survey (2006). Apart in 
Croatia, Swiss franc loans share in total loans amounts to over 5% in their peak in 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. The view that more competitive 
environment makes banks more fragile finds a confirmation in many papers that not 
only confirm the relationship, but also offer the channels for its materialization. Most 
of the researches confirming competition - fragility view use the franchise value 
hypothesis as the explanation for banks with higher market power being more stable.  
 Franchise value channel is relatively simple to explain. Bank with market power 
has more business potential and it can choose whether and in which area to use its` 
market power. Because of this potential the bank is rewarded on the market and 
has a market value well above the book value. Therefore franchise value can be 
seen as a form of non-physical, goodwill-alike value that represents a form of bank 
potential but also an opportunity cost of bank failure. Having an extra value in their 
possession, bank owners have incentive to avoid unnecessary risk. As Besanko and 
Thakor (1993) suggest, banks which appropriate informational rents from developing 
relationships with borrowers have more incentives to limit risk exposure. On the other 
hand, the loss of market power decreases the franchise value of a bank and shuts 
down this disciplining mechanism (Demsetz and others, 1996). The whole concept 
actually relies on the fact that bank owners and managers are the ones choosing 
the bank risk level. In the same time, they are aware of the market power their bank 
has (no matter how much of it has been exercised) as Marcus (1984) and Dermine 
(1986) show in theoretical work. Similarly, Keeley (1990) set theoretical and empirical 
evidence on franchise value hypothesis with emphasize on the deregulation process 
as the driver of the increased competition and fragility. Using different techniques, 
Suarez (1994), Edwards and Mishkin (1995) Hellman and others (2000) confirmed the 
trade-off between bank competition and stability. Other researchers rely on the 
effect bank competition has on the banking sector supervision, regulatory policy, 
loan portfolio diversification, etc. However, the franchise value concept is generally 
well accepted and intuitive. Besides market power, factors leading to higher 
franchise vale are considered to be: size, efficiency, reputation and relationship with 
clients (Furlong and Kwan, 2006).  
 Besides franchise-value channel, economic theory points to three additional 
channels through which competition leads to greater fragility. The first channel is the 
effect that the competition has on the banking supervision; usually presented 
through the idea that more concentrated banking sectors are easier to supervise 
and more efficient supervision lead to stability (Allen and Gale, 2004 and Beck, 
2008). The second channel is represented through the relationship between bank 
competition and payment systems. According to this channel, competition depletes 
excess liquidity in banks, as in the period of external shocks the potential for 
interbank liquidity pooling is reduced (Saez i Shi, 2004.). Finally, competition can have 
a negative effect on bank stability through the insufficient loan portfolio 
diversification. As Mishkin (1999) shows, higher market share allows for better risk 
diversification in loan portfolio which allows for continuation in loan activity in the 
period of recession.  
 However, this traditional view, where competition increases fragility of the banking 
system, is often challenged by, somewhat younger, competition - stability view 
which claims that market power can reduce stability of banks (Boyd and De Nicolo, 
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2005). According to this view, market power decreases bank stability as a result of 
risk-shifting process which is an idea is based on the two standard banking issues: 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The theoretical ground for this view was laid by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) by showing that higher interest rates that result from the lack 
of competition can easily increase moral hazard and adverse selection which results 
with increased risk in the loan portfolio. Higher interest rates change the quality 
structure of clients (by increasing the share of clients with less elastic demand for 
credit) which increases non-performing loans. Similarly, Koskela and Stenbacka 
(2000) show that pricing competition among banks leads to lower interest rates and 
higher level of investments. However, this does not affect bank default rate and 
therefore there is no trade-off between competition and stability. Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005) used risk shifting paradigm to show positive connection between 
concentration and fragility via the influence of competition on client behaviour. 
They find that increased competition reduces credit risk and increases financial 
stability.  
 Besides the risk shifting paradigm, the theory also mentions “too-big-to fail” policy 
as the reason of competition increasing stability. The rationale behind this 
explanation is that regulators are usually willing to help systematically important 
institutions in order to prevent the shock spilling through the entire sector. However, 
by knowing that they are systematically important, bank tend to be more prone to 
risk taking which makes the system less stable. This thesis has one additional 
dimension: the idea of being systematically important can influence even the 
depositors of a bank, who then become less interested in monitoring the bank they 
save with (Mishkin, 1999, Beck, 2008). Final argument of competition – stability 
proponents is that concentrated banking sectors are not easier to monitor because 
banks with higher market share are involved in more complex business activities 
which regulators have problem monitoring (Beck and others, 2006). 
 Recent work, especially after the start of the financial crisis, approached the 
competition - stability research basically from another angle, by employing more 
advanced techniques and by allowing for the non-linearity of the main relationship. 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extended the Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) famous 
risk-shifting approach and allowed for imperfect correlation in loan defaults to show 
that relationship between competition and risk is U-shaped. Also, Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2006) and Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2009), show that more 
concentrated systems are less likely to witness a banking crisis of some kind. Also, 
Berger, Klapper and Turk-Arisis (2008) show that competitive environment stimulates 
holding of higher capital which compensates more risk they are taking. Finally, Beck, 
De Jonghe and Schepens (2013) show that increase in competition will have bigger 
impact on banks` risk in countries with stricter activity restrictions, more homogenous 
market structure and deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit sharing. 
Excluding the literature using concentration measures as a proxy of competition, 
literature on the bank competition – stability relationship in CEE is rather scarce. 
However, recently, two papers, Ariss (2010) and Agoraki and others (2011), used 
Lerner index in bank level research to confirm that increase in bank market power 
leads to greater bank stability. 
  
Methodology 
Data and variables 
The specificity of every research focused bank competition is the necessity of 
generating own key variables which makes research on this matter rather data 
consuming and technically demanding. Perhaps the most extensive review of the 
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lack of this consistency was presented in Carbó et al., 2009, who showed the 
magnitude of these differences on sample of 1912 banks in 14 European countries 
from 1995 to 2001. The authors found that R-squared between the Lerner index and 
the H-statistic was only 0.06 while the R-squared between the HHI and these two 
measures were, respectively, 0.09 and 0.05. The lack of robustness of these results is a 
good motivation for authors worldwide to keep researching this area. All bank level 
data were obtained from the Bureau van Dijk/Fitch Bankscope database while real 
GDP growth was obtained from Eurostat web service. Our initial sample includes 415 
banks from 15 CEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Romania. To avoid unreliable data, only banks that were present on 
the market for at least six years were chosen in our sample. Because of market 
power and x-efficiency calculation, our initial sample of 3555 observation is reduced 
to 550. The coverage of banking sector assets in our dataset amounts to around 80% 
of the banking sector assets in average country. However, countries are not evenly 
represented in this bank-level research with some of the EU acceding and 
candidate countries entering our sample in the last couple of years.  
 Besides all the challenges, working on CEE countries still has two advantages. 
Firstly, banks in CEE countries mostly compete within the country. This means that, 
although residents (especially corporate) from the CEE countries do borrow from 
abroad, from time to time, CEE banking sectors can still be seen as relatively closed 
markets. Also, as recent literature suggests (Beck and others, 2013), heterogeneity 
often influences cross country analysis. Analysing a relatively homogenous group, 
somewhat reduces this issue. Variables used in or research can be divided in these 
four groups:  
o Bank stability (dependent variable in our main equation). Apart from Z-score, a 
composite indicator of bank default risk and its` components, we also use credit 
risk indicators:  Non-performing loans ratio, Value adjustment costs to assets, 
uncovered non-performing loans to capital. 
o Measure of individual bank market power: Competition efficiency frontier. 
o Other bank-specific (control) variables that measure bank franchise value, 
efficiency, size, funding, liquidity, regulatory burden, net-interest margin, implicit 
loan rate, implicit customer deposit rate, equity to assets, market share, credit 
growth. 
o Macro-variables that explain general macroeconomic environment where banks 
operate: real GDP growth, country dummies, crisis dummies. 
 Compared with country-level research, bank-level research on competition-
stability relationship offers the advantage of observing the process from the banks` 
perspective. However, as Beck (2008) claims, bank level research often produces 
most inconsistent results on competition - stability relationship. One of the reasons for 
these inconsistencies is the fact that the literature on bank competition - stability 
nexus may have gone too far regarding the techniques and models, while left the 
issue of selecting variables and indicators sidelined. For instance, most of the 
research will focus on the Lerner index – Z-score relationship. However, having in 
mind that both Lerner index and Z-score encompass profitability in some form in 
numerator, these results could be mechanical more than economical. Measuring 
individual bank market power, on the other hand, is technically challenging, 
especially when working with countries with lower data quality. While traditional 
Lerner index would result with yearly data, competition efficiency frontier is a relative 
measure of bank resistance towards competition and it is not calculated from prices. 
Kraft and Huljak (2011) applied CEF on a cross section of banks within one country 
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and suggested that competition may vary on different market segments in single 
country. 
 Apart from the bank individual market power, additional indicators are required in 
our research as the standard banking data does not tell the whole story. Being a 
non-observable term, bank stability as a variable is rather specific. We use Z-score, a 
standard composite indicator of bank stability that combines risk, earnings and 
capitalisation. We also use a decomposition of this indicator, as well as other 
standard portfolio risk indicators: non-performing loans ratio, value adjustment costs 
and uncovered NPLs. For bank cost efficiency we use X-efficiency (XE) concept that 
combines allocation and technical efficiencies of the bank that are both under the 
influence of bank management.  
 Finally, bank franchise value indicator is calculated as the ratio of bank market 
value to book value. However, our ratio represents a simplified version of Tobin q. 
Calculating a franchise value is important, since (in competition - fragility view) the 
disciplining mechanism within the bank is the protection of this value. With CEE banks 
rarely having an active equity market, we impute the market value by calculating 
the present value of operating revenue. For space saving purpose, we show the 
techniques for calculating bank market power, efficiency, stability and franchise 
value in the Appendix.  
 
Stylized facts 
Our relatively long sample provides an opportunity to explain CEE banking sector 
stability in historical context. In late 90s CEE banking sector stability was challenged 
by earnings volatility which resulted mostly from the credit risk materialisation that 
even took form of banking crisis in a couple of countries. As Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2000)mention, six CEE countries went through a full blown banking crisis in some form 
(Bulgaria, Czech, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) with social cost ranging from 
3% to 30% of GDP. In the aftermath of the crisis, banks had relatively high capital 
adequacy, however, high volatility of earnings and their lower level decreased the Z-
score index. In the period around 2000 the process of market consolidation gathered 
pace, which was stimulated by the foreign investors entrance (Kasman et al, 2010). 
In the period from 2001 to 2008 bank enjoyed a period of high credit growth 
accompanied with high loan portfolio quality which resulted with stable and high 
earnings which brought their Z-score to historical maximum (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
Z-score and its` components for medial CEE bank 
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 In the period of tranquillity (2001-2008), net interest margin decreased which is 
often described (heuristically) in literature as a result of bank competition. However, 
in the period of increasing loan to assets ratio and the decrease of capitalisation, 
lower net interest margins was still enough for banks to record new profitability 
heights. In this period, strong credit growth was in large portion financed from foreign 
financial institutions, leading to the increase of loan to deposit ratios. Regarding 
efficiency, standard Cost to income ratio suggests that after 2003 banks managed 
to increase their efficiency and keep it stable since. However, this indicator is 
significantly under the influence of economies of scale and technological progress 
which makes him unreliable for judging the managerial cost efficiency (Figure 2). 
 After 2008, and the onset of the financial crisis, value adjustment costs increased 
and interest revenue decreased which eroded bank earnings and reduced Z-score 
to a ten-year minimum. With banks becoming more risk averse, their capitalisation 
levels started increasing which was accompanied by loans stagnation. In the same 
time, net interest margin started to stagnate as interest rates increased with 
additional pressure of loan quality on interest income (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 
Other standard banking indicators for medial CEE bank 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
 
 Using the additional, empirical indicators, we are able to generate information 
that helps us explain further CEE banking sector trends and put the competition - 
stability relationship into historical perspective. First of all, in the period of rapid 
decrease of net interest margins, bank competition in CEE countries seems to have 
increased as both of our competition indicators suggest. Increased competition after 
2003 seems to be the result of a couple of factors. First of all, because of 
consolidation process, the number of banks decreased and with larger banks slowly 
entering all the segments of banking (especially SMEs), number of banks trying to 
reach one client, increased. Relatively similar was the effect of easily available 
foreign financing, usually from parent banks, which allowed banks to engage more 
of their assets into placements to private sector (Figure 3).  
 After 2008 bank franchise value decreased as bank average cost of capital 
increased and operating revenue started to decline. Its decrease in the period of 
decreasing market power and decreasing stability offers first anecdotal support for 
Franchise-value concept. Finally, there seems to be no efficiency increase in the 
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which is probably a result of less efficient bank leaving the market. It appears that 
after the crisis banks did not reduce their cost to income ratio owing to increased 
managers' efficiency. This was probably the result of banks decreasing unit 
administrative costs or simply selecting cheaper inputs, as we see the decline of X-
efficiency (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
Empirical banking indicators for medial bank, 5 year moving averages 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
 
Model 
The year 2008 is the year of significant economic slowdown and the start of the 
effective financial crisis in most of the CEE countries as the performance of medial 
bank (Figure 1 and Figure 2) clearly shows. For this reason, the econometric analysis is 
conducted on two sub-samples, pre-crisis period from 1997 to 2007 and the crisis 
period from 2008 to 2012. Our choice of sub-periods is also confirmed by Chow test 
that shows evidence of the break in the relationship between explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable for the period 2008 to 2012. We use fixed effects to 
control for the all time-invariant differences between countries. To confirm the 
feasibility of fixed effect, we use Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis that 
random effect are preferred. We also test the multi-colinearity (a phenomenon often 
witnessed with trans-log functions) while choosing variables for model. Finally, we 
also use the bank-level fixed effects to check the robustness of the results and run a 
two-stage least squares regression to control for possible endogenuity of market 
power by instrumenting it with its own lag.  
 With testing the relationship between bank competition and stability, we proceed 
the following way. As a first step, we conduct a relatively simple elasticity test to 
confirm the relationship between franchise value and market power. This serves as a 
robustness test not only for franchise value concept, but also for our market power 
indicator. In the second step we use our main equation to test the competition 
fragility hypothesis by modelling bank stability using a market power indicator 
alongside other control variables which corresponds with the majority of the bank-
level research. Apart from the composite stability indicator, Z-score, we use its 
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 According to the Franchise value paradigm, market power should explain a part 
of the franchise value, alongside other, more tangible indicators. Regarding the 
choice of variables, our approach here is similar to De Jonghe, and Vennet (2008) 
approach, although we use relative simple model for franchise value. Our franchise 
value elasticity test is the following: 
 
 ),,_,,,,( itititititititit REGEABANKINTMSNIMXEMPfFV , (1) 
 
with FV - franchise value, MP - market power, XE – x-efficiency, NIM - net interest 
margin , MS - market share, INT_B - interbank ratio (placements to / liabilities from 
other banks), EA - capital to assets, REG - regulatory cost (share of assets held at 
central bank). The subscripts i and t are for bank and year respectively.  
 Following Beck and others (2013) we use a set of bank-specific variables and 
macro variable to model bank stability in our main equation with market power as a 
main controlling variable. We use the following model: 
 
 ),,,,_,( ititititititit GRLTDLIQEFFSHMKMPfST , (2) 
 
with ST - bank stability, MK_SH - market share, EFF - efficiency, LIQ - liquidity, LTD - loan 
to deposit ratio for bank i in a year t, with GR being the country-level economic 
growth. The subscripts i and t are for bank and year respectively.  
 
Results 
Our franchise value elasticity test shows positive and statistically significant 
relationship between bank market power and franchise value. This test is often 
skipped in the empirical literature, with most of the authors taking for granted that 
market power influences franchise value. As expected, market power strongly 
influences franchise value, regardless of the used market power indicator. Apart 
from market power, bank size also increases franchise value. Looking from the 
“intangible” point of view, this seems reasonable since bigger banks usually enjoy 
goodwill in form of cheaper work-force (workers being willing to work for larger bank 
for smaller wages) and economies of scale. Factors decreasing bank franchise value 
are as expected regulatory burden and equity to assets ratio. Regulatory burden is 
often seen as a typical factor decreasing the franchise value and the main 
argument against strict regulation of the market. Regulatory burden leads to lower 
franchise value and decreases opportunity cost of bank default. Equity to assets 
ratio has similar effect as banks with higher capitalisation (induced by regulation or 
business circumstances) can’t engage their full potential and have to protect 
themselves from unexpected circumstances with extra capital. Regarding other 
variables, higher intermediation efficiency (net interest margin) also increases 
franchise value, since it encompasses bank know-how. Surprisingly, cost efficiency 
does not seem to increase franchise value (Table 1).  
As Beck and others (2013) suggest, the correlation between Lerner index and Z-score 
could be spurious since they both include profitability in numerator. However, our 
indicator of market power (CEF) suffers no such issues. Initially, our results do not 
provide a clear insight on the relationship between market power and bank stability 
when stability is measured with Z-score. However, stability represented with Z-score 
has two components: portfolio and leverage stability. Using the Z-score components, 
we see that banks with higher relative market power (CEF) have higher portfolio 
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stability in crisis period while we see no clear connection between market power 
and leverage stability. This is in line with the idea of CEF indicator as it is not 
dependent on size or prices and allows smaller banks to have market power on 
segmented CEE banking market. Larger CEE banks on average have higher 
leverage stability as they are usually foreign-owned and benefit from more 
comfortable capital position.  
 
Table 1 
Franchise value elasticity test 
Dependent: Franchise value   OLS Country  
f.e. 
Market power 0.912 *** 0.841*** 
x_efficiency 0.019 0.009 
Net interest margin 0.129 *** 0.134 *** 
Market share 1.322 *** 1.061 *** 
Interbank 0.000 0.000 
Equity to assets -0.069 *** -0.065 *** 
Regulation -2.487 *** -2.274 *** 
Constant 2.250 *** 2.061 *** 
N 307 307 
r2 0.51 0.58 
Note: *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 Our main equation and related robustness checks confirm competition fragility as 
we find evidence of market power being related to higher bank stability (Table 2). 
Regarding other variables, size is important for stability as well as credit growth. One 
has to be careful with this interpretation, since higher credit growth in crisis period 
could be result of some banks managing to find solid clients even when others can't 
or the result of banks protecting their own earnings by continuing to extant loans to 
lower quality clients to artificially preserve their earnings (Zombie lending). Relative 
cost efficiency is, as expected, positively connected with stability in most of the 
specifications as it increases earnings. Surprisingly, economic growth coefficients are 
mostly insignificant and have ambiguous signs indicating that the economic growth 
in current year is not important, providing that we already indicated whether we 
observe pre-crisis or crisis period. Our results remain stable if use the two-stage-least-
squares procedure as well. 
 In the next step, we examine the robustness of our results by looking at the credit 
risk indicators of CEE banks regarding their market power. Even though credit risk is 
only one factor influencing bank total risk profile (portfolio stability), in CEE countries it 
is clearly the most important one. Our results show that, banks with higher market 
power have lower non-performing loans ratio and lower capital burden of 
uncovered non-performing loans which is also consistent with competition - fragility 
view. On the other hand, we find only weak evidence of banks with more market 
power having lower value adjustment costs to asset ratio. 
 
  




Competition – fragility test with Z-score and its components  
  Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
  OLS   Country 
f.e. 
OLS   Country 
f.e. 
  
  Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Dep: Z-score 
 
Market power 0.53   -0.37   0.39   -0.09   
X_efficiency 1.23 * 2.49 *** -0.73 * 0.10   
Liquidity 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.01   
Credit growth 0.00   0.00   0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
Loan to deposit 0.06   0.11   -0.04   0.01   
Market share 0.66   2.41 *** 0.62   1.97 * 
Growth -0.01   0.18 * -0.06 *** -0.02   
Cons 2.60 *** 0.14   3.98 *** 3.24 *** 
                  
N of obs 144   144   416   416   
R-sq. 0.07   0.24   0.15   0.33   
Dep: Portfolio stability 
 
Market power 1.09 * 0.58   0.88 ** 0.63 ** 
X_efficiency 1.45 * 2.87 *** -1.24 ** -0.46   
Liquidity -0.01   -0.01   0.00   0.00 ** 
Credit growth 0.00   0.00   0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
Loan to deposit 0.26   0.26   -0.04   -0.01   
Market share 2.46 *** 4.19 *** 3.39 *** 4.69 *** 
Growth -0.02   -0.19   -0.01   0.01   
Cons -0.08   -2.90 ** 1.36 *** 0.78   
                  
N of obs 133   133   333   333   
R-sq. 0.22   0.33   0.14   0.26   
Dep: Leverage stability 
  
Market power 0.45   -0.42   0.36   -0.14   
X_efficiency 1.10 * 2.35 *** -0.80 * -0.11   
Liquidity 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.01   
Credit growth 0.00   0.00   0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
Loan to deposit 0.06   0.09   -0.03   0.02   
Market share 0.44   2.11 ** 0.09   1.45   
Growth -0.01   0.16 * -0.05 *** -0.01   
Cons 2.67 *** 0.28   3.95 *** 3.30 *** 
                  
N of obs 144   144   416   416   
R-sq. 0.05   0.23   0.13   0.31   
Note: * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
   
Discussion 
Before financial crisis, banking sector s of CEE countries enjoyed a period of 
tranquillity with high earnings, strong capital and low volatility. Consequently, the 
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stability of banks was high with Z-scores reaching their maximum historical values. In 
the period of financial crisis, after 2008, stability of banks in CEE decreased 
noticeably, with loan quality and weak credit growth leading to significant earnings 
decrease. In the same time, competition between banks increased as the market 
started to shrink.  
 Using a relatively simple elasticity test, we show that market power contributes to 
the franchise value of banks making the franchise value channel possible. Results of 
our main equation and associated robustness tests are consistent with competition 
fragility hypothesis since that we find evidence of banks with higher market power 
being more stable in the period of crisis. Our competition – fragility results are in line 
with some of the recent research on this matter - Berger et al. (2008) and Turk –Arisis 
(2010), and Jimenez et al. (2013). Using two subsamples, two measures of bank 
specific market power and two panel regression specifications our results are robust.  
 Our market power indicator is associated with higher portfolio stability, while we 
find no significant relationship with the leverage stability. In the next step we find no 
evidence of banks with more market power having higher net interest margins which 
suggests that their stability is not a result of higher prices that increase profitability 
included in stability measure. Even more, we actually find some evidence of banks 
with more market power having lower implicit interest rates (both passive and 
active) which could be under the influence of different client structure.   
 Consequently, our results suggest that banks in CEE use their market power outside 
the pricing strategy as they accomplish lower portfolio volatility through the higher 
quality of relationship with their clients. So instead of economic rents, banks with 
more market power use the advantage of informational rents as Allen and Gale 
(2004) suggest. This way, their clients benefit from stable funding and lower interest 
rates, while they benefit from lower reinvestment risk and higher asset quality. In that 
sense, growing differences in Z-score between CEE banks bare down to the quality 
issue. Results imply that banks with higher market power gain the advantage over 
weaker banks not through the aggressive interest rate policy, but through the 
acquiring better clients and investing in relationship with them. Results also imply that 
banks with less market power get stuck with clients of lower average quality which 
leads to decreasing interest revenue and higher value adjustment costs.  
  
Conclusion 
To conclude, bank franchise value seems to be a well functioning self disciplining 
mechanism within the CEE banks. As the theory suggests and our results confirm, 
stricter regulation and increasing competition are factors causing its decline which 
should be important information for policy makers. Increasing bank competition can 
have some positive implications (like increasing efficiency), however its effect can 
be offset with some stability losses which make the net effect of such an increase 
uncertain from the social welfare point of view. Looking from the perspective of CEE 
banks, joining the Banking Union, which creates a level playing field for members, 
could result in market power convergence to the somewhat lower level of older EU 
member states. Consistent with our findings of competition fragility relationship this 
could increase bank individual riskiness in the future. 
 There are several ways how this research can be expanded. First, in future 
research, it could be beneficial to test the risk shifting paradigm only on banks with 
less market power. Second, this research could benefit from employing dynamic 
panel analysis in form of GMM and Arlano-Bover estimator to combine fixed effect 
and lagged dependent variable. Initial test suggest that our results hold, when we 
control for the endogeneity and when we include lag of depended variable into 
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equation. However, as Beck and others (2013) suggest, pooling the data always 
hides cross-country variation and additional work on the technique could prove to 
be beneficial. From the technical point of view, our research as well as similar 
research on this topic could benefit from causality test. However, causality tests on 
panel data, although possible, are still rarely used and pose a few challenges. 
Finally, although the robustness of results was tested by using other bank stability 
measures, Z-score is an indicator developed for manufacturing companies and it 
rewards stability even on unwanted levels. Therefore, future research could also 
benefit from Z-score modification or using some other bank stability indicator. 
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Competition efficiency frontier calculation 
The Competition efficiency (CEF) concept, recently developed by Bolt and Humprey 
(2010), is from the technical perspective, an efficiency measure. However, in this 
approach, the efficiency refers to the competition as a process. Therefore, the bank 
or a group of banks on the CE frontier is actually a bank or a group whose revenue 
was the most restrained by the competition. This means that while we still maintain 
that bank revenue reflects productivity, cost and competition, we actually reverse 
the story and claim that revenues of banks are restrained by productivity, cost and 
competition. 
 Like Bolt and Humphrey (2010), we maintain that banks use spread revenue and 
non-interest revenue as their two main sources of revenue. However, since we lack 
the data to calculate the CEF for non-interest activities, we calculate only the CEF 
for spread business.  
For estimation of spread revenue and non-interest revenue, we use the standard 
transcendental function in logs with two inputs (working and physical capital): 
 
  































Where: Y – spread revenue to operating costs, Pk – productivity ratios: labor deposit 
ratio and tangible assets to deposit ratio, X – input costs: price of labor, price of 
physical capital, Pm – unit costs: processing cost, tangible assets unit cost and equity 
to assets. The subscripts i and t are for bank and year respectively. 
 In a composed error framework, equation (2) can be expressed as: 
 
                             
uePXXRocrev kji lnln)ln,ln,(ln)/ln(                           (2) 
 
 Under the DFA approach (Berger, 1993) the total residual is made of random part 
and competition part ( eln   and  uln  respectively). Over long enough time period 
eln  will average to close to zero, while uln  will average to the competition effect. 
Afterwards, the series of residuals is averaged across banks and only then averaged 
bank residuals are averaged across bank groups (based on size, ownership, and 
strategy, survival). Only then was the CEF calculated using the following formula: 
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Where: CEF - competition efficiency for a bank or a group of banks,   i
u
- averaged 
residuals across time for a certain bank or a group of banks and minu  the minimum i
u
 
vector. Thus the ratio is an estimate of the ratio of for the bank or a group of banks 
compared with the bank or bank group facing the greatest competition while 
having the same underlying cost and service productivity.  
 
Measuring bank stability 
Being a non-observable term, banking stability as a variable is rather specific. In 
bank-level research like ours, most of the authors use Z-score, an indicator that 
conveniently, combines risk, earnings and capitalisation which is in a way the core of 
banking business. However, as Kohler (2012) shows, the Z-score is actually a 
combination of two separate stabilities that can annul each other. This is the reason 
why, apart from the standard Z-score, we also look at its two components: portfolio 
stability and leverage stability. 
 










                                              (4) 
 
Where: Z - Z-score, k - three year - average Return on average assets,   - equity to 
assets,   - three year standard deviation of Return on average assets, P - portfolio 
stability and L - leverage stability. 
 
Measuring bank x-efficiency 
For bank cost efficiency, we use X-efficiency (XE) concept that combines alocative 
and technical efficiencies (both under the influence of bank management) in 
unknown proportion (thus the X name). For the same reasons as with CEF, for the 
individual bank X-efficiency, we also apply DFA to dismantle residuals on efficiency 
and random parts. We follow Berger and Hannan (1998) who measure X-efficiency, 
or the closeness of the bank costs to the minimum costs for the bank’s output that 
could be achieved on the efficient frontier. In other words, we believe that 
competitive pressures or the lack of it will influence only relative bank efficiency, 
while it will not influence technological progress or economy of scale which depends 
on the optimal size of the bank. 
 To estimate efficiency Berger and Hannan (1998) assume that the cost function 
has a composite error term that includes both inefficiencies (deviations from the 
efficient frontier) and random error (luck, measurement error). The difficulty in 
estimating efficiency is in disentangling the two elements. This is exactly where DFA 
method proves its value. While most studies must impose distributions in order to 
separate them, DFA relieves us of the issue but requires a time series of data for each 
of our banks in return. The key assumption is that cost differences owing to 
inefficiency are relatively stable and should persist over time, while those owing to 
random error will average out over time.  
 For the XE calculation, we use standard trans-log cost function with three inputs 
(financial capital, labour and physical capital) and three outputs (investments, loans 
and fees):  
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 Where: TC - total operational costs of a bank i in the period t, W - input prices,  Y - 
bank outputs (loans, investments and fees and commissions), and   - the residual. 
The subscripts i and t are for bank and year respectively. 
For the DFA method, a cost function is modified as: 
 
                                  tiijijtij
vixwYCC lnln),(lnln 
,                                          (6) 
 
 Where ln - natural logarithms, t - time, C - operating costs, C(Y, w) - a cost function 
with output quantity vector Y and input price vector w, lnx - an efficiency factor, and 
lnv – a random error. All the components in equation (6) vary over time except for 
the efficiency factor xi, which is assumed to be constant for bank i. To calculate 
efficiency, we average the residuals from equation (6) for each bank over the 5 
years. This average residual, ln xˆi for each bank, is an estimate of ln xi , given that 
the random errors ln vit will tend to cancel each other out for each firm separately in 
the averaging. We transform ln xˆi into a normalized measure of efficiency: 
 
                                    iii
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 Where min - the minimum for all i. This is an estimate of the ratio of costs for the 
most efficient bank in the sample to bank i costs for bank i combination of outputs 
and input prices. This corresponds with the conventional notion of efficiency as the 
ratio of the minimum resources needed for production to the resources actually 
used, and ranges over (0, 1), with higher values indicating greater efficiency.  
 
Measuring bank franchise vale 
Unlike book value that is relatively easy to calculate form the balance sheet, the 
market value is not easily available since CEE banks rarely trade on the stock 
exchange. Therefore in order to calculate bank market value we discount the 
operating profit with banks` the cost of capital in a model of eternal rent and this 
way calculate imputed market value. This relatively simple way of calculating 
franchise value allows us to generate enough observations for CEE countries. 
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With FV - franchise value, MVA - market value, BVA - book value, OP - operating 
profit, WACC - weighted average cost of capital, EQ - balance sheet equity. The 
subscripts i and t are for bank and year respectively. 
